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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Following a jury trial, Jesse Eugene Mann was convicted of trafficking in 
marijuana and two misdemeanor offenses for driving without privileges and possession 
of drug paraphernalia. Mr. Mann appealed. He argued that the district court erred by 
denying his motion to suppress based on its determination he lacked standing to 
challenge the search of the rental car. He also argued that the district court improperly 
instructed the jury on the misdemeanor charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to respond to the State’s arguments regarding the 
appropriate test to determine an unauthorized driver’s privacy interest in a rental car 
and the elements of possession of drug paraphernalia, a specific intent crime. 
   
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Mann’s Appellant’s Brief. (See App. Br., pp.1–6.) They are not repeated in this 
Reply Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference. 
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ISSUES 
I. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Mann’s motion to suppress? 
 
II. Did the district court err when it failed to instruct the jury that the State had to 








The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Mann’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 The district court applied the totality of the circumstances test from State v. 
Cutler, 144 Idaho 272 (Ct. App. 2007), to determine Mr. Mann lacked standing to 
challenge the police’s search of a rental car. (Tr., p.29, L.6–p.32, L.10.) On appeal, 
Mr. Mann challenged the district court’s ruling that he had no privacy interest in the car. 
(App. Br., pp.8–16.) Among other arguments, Mr. Mann contended that this Court 
should reconsider or reject the totality of the circumstances test from Cutler and instead 
adopt the test from Judge Lansing’s concurring opinion in that case. (App. Br., pp.9–13.) 
The State asserts that the Court should decline Mr. Mann’s request to reconsider or 
reject Cutler. (Resp. Br., p.6.)  
 Unlike the majority test, Judge Lansing’s test allows an unauthorized driver to 
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car with permission from the 
lessee. Cutler, 144 Idaho at 976 (Lansing, J., concurring). The Eighth and Ninth Circuits 
have adopted similar tests. See State v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 1223, 1225 (8th Cir. 1998). The State claims that the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ approach is the minority view, but the same can be said of the 
test adopted by the majority in Cutler. In Cutler, the Court of Appeals considered the 
“three disparate approaches” in the federal circuit courts to the question of standing for 
an unauthorized driver of a rental car. 144 Idaho at 274. Ultimately, the majority adopted 
the totality of the circumstances test from the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Smith, 263 
F.3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2001). Cutler, 144 Idaho at 275. The Smith approach is also an 
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outlier, however. Only the Third Circuit has adopted a similar test. See United States v. 
Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 165 (7th Cir. 2011) (adopting a rule that an unauthorized driver 
has no standing unless “extraordinary circumstances” suggest an expectation of 
privacy). Thus, while the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that an 
unauthorized driver never has standing, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held 
otherwise if the driver has permission, the Seventh Circuit has yet to “take sides,” and 
the Third and Sixth Circuits require extraordinary or unique circumstances to establish 
standing. United States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 2015) (summarizing the 
circuit split); see Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1196–97 (same). This unresolved split makes 
evident there is no prevailing view on the privacy interest held by unauthorized drivers 
of rental cars. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ approach is as viable as all others on this 
contested issue.  
 But, unlike the other approaches, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ test is most 
consistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As explained by the Ninth Circuit: 
[W]e must reject the government’s contention that a defendant not listed 
on a lease agreement lacks standing to challenge a search. Based on 
Portillo, Jones, Dorais, and Henderson,1 we cannot base constitutional 
                                            
1 In United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit held 
a “non-owner has standing to challenge a search where he has ‘permission to use his 
friend’s automobile and the keys to the ignition and the trunk, with which he could 
exclude all others, save his friend, the owner.’” Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1197. “In  Jones v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960), the defendant had standing to challenge a 
search of a friend’s apartment when he had permission to use the apartment, had a key 
to the apartment, stored his belongings there, and had the right and ability to exclude 
others, except the owner, from the apartment.” Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1198. In United 
States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit “noted that ‘the 
mere expiration of the rental period, in the absence of affirmative acts of repossession 
by the lessor, does not automatically end a lessee’s expectations of privacy’ in a motel 
room.” Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1198. Finally, in United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 
647 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit “held that the lessee of a rental car has a 
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standing entirely on a rental agreement to which the unauthorized driver 
was not a party and may not capture the nature of the unauthorized 
driver’s use of the car. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) 
(stating that “arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law . . . 
ought not . . . control” the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy 
(citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960)). Rather, an 
unauthorized driver who received permission to use a rental car and has 
joint authority over the car may challenge the search to the same extent 
as the authorized renter. This approach is in accord with precedent 
holding that indicia of ownership—including the right to exclude others—
coupled with possession and the permission of the rightful owner, are 
sufficient grounds upon which to find standing. Jones, 362 U.S. at 266; 
Portillo, 633 F.2d at 1317.  
 
Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1198–99; see also Justin E. Simmons, Comment, Hertz and The 
Fourth Amendment: A Post-Rakas Examination of an Unauthorized Driver’s Standing to 
Challenge the Legality of a Rental Car Search, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 149 (2008) 
(arguing the federal courts should adopt the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ test). This 
approach is also in accord with the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Hanson, which 
held that a non-owner driver can establish a privacy interest in a vehicle with 
possession plus authorization from the owner or a person believed to have authority. 
142 Idaho 711, 719 (Ct. App. 2006). In the Fourth Amendment context, the privacy 
interest of an unauthorized driver should be evaluated the same as a non-owner driver. 
For these reasons, as well as those stated in Mr. Mann’s Appellant’s Brief, the Court 
should reconsider or reject the Cutler holding and adopt Judge Lansing’s proposed test 
from her concurring opinion in Cutler. (See App. Br., pp.10–13.)  
 Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Mann had permission from the lessee to drive the 
rental car. (See Tr., p.10, L.22–p.12, L.14, p.26, Ls.20–21.) Thus, if the Court adopts 
                                                                                                                                            
reasonable expectation of privacy in it, even after the lease period expires, as long as 
the lessee retains possession and control over the car.” Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1198. 
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Judge Lansing’s approach, Mr. Mann asserts that he has met his burden to establish a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle. Alternatively, Mr. Mann 
maintains that he established a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car using 
the majority test from Cutler. (See App. Br., pp.13–16.) Because Mr. Mann has 
established a privacy interest in the car, he requests that this Court vacate the district 
court’s order denying his motion to suppress and remand this case to resolve the other 
issues raised in his suppression motion, namely, the constitutionality of the warrantless 
search of the vehicle. (See App. Br., pp.15–16.) 
  
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Instruct The Jury That The State Had To 
Prove Mr. Mann Possessed The Paraphernalia With The Intent To Use In Idaho 
 
 During deliberations, the jury asked the district court if “intending to use” meant 
“use in Idaho” or “elsewhere.” (Aug. R., p.1.) The district court responded: “You are 
instructed that any possession of paraphernalia must occur in Idaho. If you find 
defendant possessed paraphernalia in Idaho, you must consider whether the defendant 
intended to use the paraphernalia. It does not matter in which state the defendant 
formed the intent to use the paraphernalia.” (R., p.202 (Instruction No. 21).) Mr. Mann 
maintains that Instruction No. 21 was improper as a matter of law. It confused and 
misled the jury on the specific intent element of possession of drug paraphernalia. (See 
App. Br., pp.17–21.)  
 In response, the State argues that neither the plain language of I.C. § 37-2734A 
nor the pattern jury instruction I.C.J.I 408 explicitly requires intent to use while in Idaho. 
(Respt. Br., pp.12–14.) Mr. Mann agrees. The State does not have to prove the 
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defendant was going to or had used the paraphernalia while in Idaho. But that issue is 
beside the point. The location in which the defendant intends to use the paraphernalia is 
irrelevant. The relevant inquiry is whether the defendant possessed the paraphernalia 
for that purpose while in Idaho. Possession of drug paraphernalia is a specific intent 
crime. State v. Williams, 134 Idaho 590, 592 (Ct. App. 2000). As such, the State must 
prove that, when the defendant possessed the paraphernalia in Idaho, he had the intent 
to use it to introduce a controlled substance into the body. See I.C. § 18-114 (requiring 
a union of act and intent for all crimes). Otherwise, the mere possession of any item that 
was once used or could be used to introduce a substance into the body would violate 
the statute. Instruction No. 21 endorsed this flawed interpretation, however. By 
informing the jury it did not matter where Mr. Mann formed the intent to use the 
paraphernalia, any intent to use—past, present, or future—with no connection to the act 
of possession would suffice to prove the elements of the offense. Thus, the jury could 
find Mr. Mann guilty even if he presently did not (but once had) intended to use the 
paraphernalia to introduce a substance into the body. Such an interpretation is contrary 
to the requirement of specific intent for possession of drug paraphernalia. Instruction 
No. 21 thus relieved the State of its burden to prove an essential element of the offense 
and was in error.  
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CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Mann respectfully requests that the Court vacate the district court’s order 
denying his motion to suppress and remand the case for further proceedings on his 
motion to suppress, including a determination of whether the search of the rental car 
was lawful. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that the Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia and remand the case for a new trial. 
 DATED this 7th day of September, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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